Will a Kremlin takeover be an actual possibility any time soon? A look at the current state of affairs: evaluations, expert estimates, and more or less plausible future possibilities.
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| [Moscow,Russia/EUROPEANS24] |
Giving in to this equation would be offering a favour to the tyrant who set the tone for Ukraine's aggressiveness towards Russia, which would be a mistake. In the meanwhile, experts say that the majority of Russians support Putin, making a takeover of the Kremlin unlikely any time soon. For a variety of factors. This new control is reminiscent of Soviet-style censorship since the president had two decades to gradually muzzle the free press and independent media, so preventing public discussion. There is no disagreement or issue on state television, and the broadcasts are anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western propaganda in no clear terms. Those who reside outside of major cities are affected by the continual allusion to the former glory that "dissolved" with the demise of the Soviet Union. Protests around Russia resulted in the detention of at least 15,000 people and the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Russians. The greatest portion of the nation is going, according to Masha Gessen in the New Yorker. However, it is insufficient to topple a system with such a sturdy foundation.
By opposing the Russian blitzkrieg, the Ukrainian military and the whole Ukrainian populace (who were both backed by a more united West than in previous years) have transformed the struggle into a far more complex one. The Kremlin's top official is in the midst of the most challenging period in his or her twenty-two-year reign. Claims that Defense Minister Shoigu's "strange" absence and the possible arrest of two FSB (former KGB) officials suggest that there may be a problem at the highest levels. Even though the Kremlin is reliant on Putin's supporters, they create a tight magic circle around the president's head. This is a significant signal, but the fact that certain technocrats and oligarchs who have been substantially fined by international sanctions are dissatisfied is not. They don't have the wherewithal to take on Putin.
All of these factors may contribute to the president's declining popularity, including a prolonged conflict, a struggling economy, growing unemployment, and flaws in an already weak military. There are a number of scenarios that might unfold in Russia in April when the new mandatory call comes into effect, according to Mark Galeotti, an honorary professor at University College London and a member of the oldest and most famous British military think tank, Rusi. desertions. Russia's military is disillusioned and stymied.
A coup in Russia is not a realistic scenario
There is no way to defenestrate Putin without a coup, despite the fact that the three crucial "entities" (the political elite, the military, and the secret services) are not united. Secret services, including the FSB, will remain steadfast in their support of the president. Institutional counterweights provide stability in a nation with well-established political systems and no significant opposition, even in a crisis like the present one.
We make the ridiculous assumption that the FSB or the Ministry of Defense is behind the coup. The Russian National Guard, a force of 300,000 soldiers constituted by legislation six years ago by the Kremlin and nominally tasked with combating terrorism and organised crime, could and presumably would step in to defend Putin. According to numerous analysts, Putin's main goal is to keep him safe from any and all threats. Someone referred to it as his personal army. Viktor Zolotov, a former Putin bodyguard, is the chairman of this special committee, and he has amassed a fortune owing to his close ties to the president (and like him various officers of the National Guard).
Putin has created a ruthless security system
Another key component is the establishment of a network of military counterintelligence operatives inside the armed services. Putin's grip on power depends on it. The FSB bolstered the military counterintelligence presence of its predecessor, the KGB, shortly after his ascension to power. To keep tabs on the Russian military, counterintelligence agents are stationed right alongside their counterparts in the regular army. Putin used to refer to the counterintelligence division as a "mini-FSB" while he was in charge of the FSB.
Since he took office in late 1999, Putin has put in place a brutal security apparatus and has been preparing for the possibility of a palace or military coup. To prevent a coup from occurring, the Russian coercive apparatus employs a variety of methods. In addition to the regular army and the National Guard, the dictatorship has a variety of other security agencies with considerable intelligence-gathering capabilities. In the event of a coup, these agencies will be able to stop it in its tracks.
What specific steps might be taken to bring down Putin's dictatorship in the future, no matter how close or remote it may be? As ForeignPolicy.com points out, Viktor Yanukovych's demise in Ukraine may be a good analogy for what's happening in the United States in certain ways. A total of 70 people were killed after Yanukovych ordered his security forces to open fire on protestors during the night of February 19-20, 2014. However, rather than putting an end to the demonstrations, the repression resulted in their intensification and the defection of key members of the regime's security forces and influential people. The SBU's security agency stated shortly after that it would suspend activities against the protesters. Shortly afterwards. Yanukovych went into exile in Russia because there were no security forces ready to intervene. When authoritarian governments seem to be stable, they abruptly fall apart. Vladimir Putin isn't the only one.
The sanctions
Some analysts have speculated that with sanctions taking a toll on the economy, a movement to remove Putin from office might gain momentum. Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko, who has researched post-Soviet upheavals, disagrees. In an interview with Al Jazeera, he said, "I don't believe revolution is the most probable result of sanctions," claiming that nothing that has occurred so far is sufficient to spark an uprising. It would be necessary to have "a breach amongst the elites." After a catastrophic setback in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and another during the First World War in 1917, the Russian Empire saw two revolutions at the dawn of the twentieth century.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, mass uprisings have taken place in Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova, where governments have been overthrown. In Kyrgyzstan, there have been three revolutions, while in Ukraine, there have been four. Vladimir Putin has been planning a "colour revolution" like the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine for the previous two decades, which he believed was orchestrated by the United States. Opposition leaders like Alexey Navalny, whose political activity has been banned but continues to function and is helping to coordinate the rallies, have been marginalised as part of the approach.
According to Ishchenko, the opposition is in a horrible state. "There is a crackdown on Navalny's movement. This opposition is more fragmented because of what is happening in Ukraine. Allies of the opposition, including the Communist Party, are now enthusiastically in favour of the war." Anti-war Russians' departure from Russia since February 24th has made it even less probable for an uprising to take place, according to Ishchenko to Al Jazeera.
Russian oligarchs have no influence on the Kremlin
Russia's 1990s billionaires were soon reined in by Vladimir Putin after his election as president. He called a conference of the country's most powerful businessmen and told them to remain out of politics. Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Boris Berezovsky were both imprisoned and told to leave Russia if they didn't cooperate. For the most part, the people who earned their riches in the 1990s and were permitted to remain have come to terms with the status quo. The Kremlin has little sway on them. Putin has also subjugated liberals among Russia's elite, despite the obvious expectation that they would take a pro-peace posture.
A probable street rebellion, according to the political scientist and military expert Pavel Luzin? Is this a coup? As of right now, they aren't circumstances that can be seen clearly. Joe Biden concluded his Saturday address in Warsaw by saying of Vladimir Putin, "This guy cannot continue in power," before the predictable denials. Talk of regime change is dangerous because it has the potential to inflame Moscow's mindset toward the present leadership as a "fight to the finish" in which compromise is out of the question. Putin will undoubtedly feel the heat as time passes. It's the only thing we can count on.
The Wall Street Journal's John Deni, a professor at the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, brings another perspective to the discussion. In spite of the fact that a coup may or may not come to fruition, one thing is certain: "Whoever succeeds Putin will face the same internal political incentives and disincentives, which would likely lead to a continued coup." Russia's aggressive stance against the West. We can learn a lot about how authoritarian regimes arise, endure, and end through the study of political science and history. The regime that follows is often not democratic in highly individualised governments like Putin's Russia.
The author Andrea Maggiolo is an Italian political journalist.