Government with a two-thirds majority controls parliament too much. Such huge alliances undermine the core premise of democracy.
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| Schleswig-Holstein Prime Minister Daniel Günther |
After his election victory on May 8, 2022, Schleswig-Holstein Prime Minister Daniel Günther stunned the nation by declaring that he would like to retain the Jamaica coalition with the Greens and the FDP. There is no mathematical necessity for this. The CDU would have its own majority with both the FDP and the Greens. From the point of view of the little partners, a "surplus coalition" would have the disadvantage that they may be played off against each other as the majority procurers.
In reality, both sides have rejected Günther's mind tricks. And Günther agreed on Monday to start coalition discussions with the Greens . According to the textbook of coalition theory, however, he should have selected for the FDP: on the one hand, this is the numerically much weaker partner compared to the Greens, against whom one might assert more. On the other hand, the political overlap between the CDU and the FDP is higher than that of the Greens.
But now coalition discussions with the Greens. The underlying strategic issues are clear from the CDU point of view. If you maintain the Greens in your own camp, you may be able to guarantee an eco-bourgeois majority against the rivalry of social democracy in the long run.
This line of thinking is inspired by the beginning of coalition discussions between the black and green parties in North Rhine-Westphalia also on Monday. In spite of this, having a black and green coalition in Schleswig-Holstein would be an awful idea, much as having a large Jamaican coalition. In the Federal Republic, the idea that broad coalitions are only created in times of crisis has traditionally been treated as if it were some sort of natural rule. Black-Green is exactly what it sounds like: a grand alliance made up of the two groups that have the most votes and seats combined.
It's possible that people aren't aware of this because, up until relatively recently, in the party system of the Federal Republic of Germany, the phrase "grand coalition" (capitalized in this case) always rhymed with "Schwarz-Rot" or "Rot-Schwarz," which refers to an alliance between the Union and the SPD. This information is likely being pushed to the back of people's minds. But with today's six-party system and the declining power of the major parties, those days are a thing of the past.
The associated weakness of the parliamentary opposition is the primary issue with big coalitions from a democratic point of view. This is the major difficulty with grand coalitions. The fact that these institutions exist and are able to carry out their functions is one of the defining characteristics of democracy in general and parliamentary democracy in particular.
The majority of state constitutions, but sadly not the Basic Law, take this into consideration by expressly highlighting how important the opposition is to the functioning of the government. The people of Schleswig-Holstein have the constitutional right to equal political opportunity, as stated in Article 18 of the state's constitution. Additionally, the second paragraph of the same article places an emphasis on the unique role that the most powerful opposition party plays in providing the "leader of the opposition."
The right to equal political opportunities is embodied in the minority rights that are laid out in the constitution as well as the rules of procedure of the state parliament, both of which are of course linked to specific quorums. This right to equal political opportunities also includes the right to vote. For instance, in Schleswig-Holstein, one third of the deputies or two parliamentary groups must jointly apply for a norm control procedure before the state constitutional court. The constitutionality of a referendum must be examined by one quarter of the deputies, and a committee of inquiry must be established by one fifth of the deputies.
For obtaining access to files within the scope of the committee of inquiry, the same quorum is sufficient; however, in the plenary session of the state parliament, a quorum of 25 percent is necessary. In addition, the Kiel state legislature must to vote with a majority of two-thirds in order to modify the constitution.
With 48 out of 69 seats, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Green Party would have a two-thirds majority in the next Kiel state parliament if they were to establish a government. All of the control powers held by the opposition that were just outlined were, in all actuality, useless. They were either completely inaccessible to the opposition parties or, in the case of norm control, the examination of files during the plenary session of the state parliament, or the establishment of an investigation committee, could only be carried out in conjunction with the ruling party.
In a form of government structured according to the parliamentary model, the concept of a "government on hold" linked with the opposition would be a waste of time. Thus, Schleswig-Holstein would follow the poor example set by the federal government, where the FDP's irresponsible withdrawal from the Jamaica negotiations in 2017 ensured that a new grand coalition had to be formed, and the role of the leading opposition party was given to the right-wing populist AfD. This would mean that Schleswig-Holstein would follow the bad example set by the federal government, which would result in Schleswig-Holstein following the bad example set by the federal
It would be best for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Green Party (Greens) in Schleswig-Holstein to abandon the idea of forming a coalition government together if they want the concept that a parliamentary government requires a robust opposition as an opponent to remain more than just a phrase. The options are glaringly obvious: the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) might establish a "small" coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP) in accordance with the standard political science textbook. Or, it may rule on its own as a minority administration and make arrangements for its creation and support to be accepted by either one or both of the "Jamaica partners." This second option would equate to ruling with shifting majorities.
Either option would be preferable than a government with an excessively high majority. When seen through the lens of democracy, despite the fact that this may be "framed" in a good light as an effort to show the widest possible agreement in society, it is abundantly evident that the drawbacks much exceed the benefits.
The author Frank Decker is Professor of Political Science at the University of Bonn.
Source: Der Tagesspiegel